Search
1098 matching practices
| Number | Best Practice |
|---|---|
| 13-8-8092 | Network Operators and Service Providers should adopt a customer-directed policy whereby misuse of the network would lead to measured enforcement actions up to and including termination of services. |
| 13-8-8094 | Service Providers should implement customer client software that uses the strongest permissible encryption appropriate to the asset being protected. |
| 13-8-8095 | Network Operators and Service Providers should establish, where technology allows, limiters to prevent undue consumption of system resources (e.g., system memory, disk space, CPU consumption, network bandwidth) in order to prevent degradation or disruption of performance of services. |
| 13-8-8096 | Network Operators and Service Providers should educate service customers on the importance of, and the methods for, installing and using a suite of protective measures (e.g., strong passwords, anti-virus software, firewalls, IDS, encryption) and update as available. |
| 13-8-8105 | Network Operators and Service Providers should incorporate cellular voice encryption services and ensure that such encryption services are enabled for end users. (Voice encryption services depend on the wireless technology used, and are standards based). |
| 13-8-8106 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should employ operating system hardening and up-to-date security patches for all accessible wireless servers and wireless clients. Employ strong end user authentication for wireless IP connections. Employ logging of all wireless IP connections to ensure traceability back to end user. Employ up-to-date encryption capabilities available with the devices. In particular, vulnerable network and personal data in cellular clients must be protected if the handset is stolen. |
| 13-8-8113 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should not permit local logon of users other than the system administrator. Local logon of a system administrator should be used only for troubleshooting or maintenance purposes. Some systems differentiate a local account database and network-accessible, centralized account database. Users should be authenticated via a network-accessible, centralized account database, not a local accounts database. |
| 13-8-8114 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should use difficult to guess community string names, or current SNMP version equivalent. |
| 13-8-8115 | Equipment Suppliers should provide controls to protect network elements and their control plane interfaces against compromise and corruption. Vendors should make such controls and filters easy to manage and minimal performance impacting. |
| 13-8-8116 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should participate in industry forums to define secure, authenticated control plane protocols and operational, business processes to implement them. |
| 13-8-8120 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should use equipment and products that support a central revocation list and revoke digital certificates that are suspected of having been compromised. |
| 13-8-8133 | Network Operators, Service Providers should adhere to the same information for disaster recovery or business continuity solutions as security Best Practices as the solutions used under normal operating conditions. |
| 13-8-8135 | Equipment Suppliers should implement techniques such as tamper-proof cryptochips/authentication credentials and authentication for (service provider) configuration controls, in customer premises equipment. |
| 13-8-8505 | Network Operators and Service Providers should work with the Equipment Supplier to resolve the inadequacies of the solution, using a pre-deployment, staging area, where hardened configurations can be tested when new default settings introduce vulnerabilities or the default configuration is found to be vulnerable. |
| 13-8-8507 | Network Operators and Service Providers should consider which systems/services the affected system could be disconnected from to minimize access and connectivity while allowing desired activities to continue when it is discovered that a system is running with a higher level of privilege than necessary; conduct a forensic analysis to assess the possibility of having potentially compromised data and identify what may have been compromised and for how long it has been in a compromised state; and reconnect system to back-office with appropriate security levels implemented. |
| 13-8-8513 | Network Operators and Service Providers should consult with legal counsel in the event that an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) is not in place, or an event occurs that is not documented within the AUP. Consulting with legal counsel, develop and adapt a policy based on lessons learned in the security incident and redistribute the policy when there are changes. |
| 13-8-8514 | Service Providers should upon discovering the misuse or unauthorized use of the network, shut down the port in accordance with AUP (Acceptable Use Policy) and clearance from legal counsel. Review ACL (Access Control List) and temporarily remove offending address pending legal review and reactivate the port after the threat has been mitigated. |
| 13-8-8515 | Network Operators and Service Providers should perform forensic analysis on the system, conduct a post-mortem analysis and enforce system resource quotas if a misuse or unauthorized use of a system is detected. |
| 13-8-8519 | Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should undertake one or more of the following: 1) Provide additional employee training. 2) Reassign, dismiss, or discipline the employee when it is discovered that there has been a failure in the hiring process and the new employee does not in fact have the proper capabilities or qualifications for the job. |
| 13-8-8525 | Network Operators and Service Providers should apply the same filtering methods used in NRIC BP 8043 more aggressively to stop the attack if the routing table is under attack from malicious BGP updates. When under attack, the attack vector is usually known and the performance impacts of the filter are less of an issue than when preventing an attack. The malicious routes will expire from the table, be replaced by legitimate updates, or in emergencies, can be manually deleted from the tables. Contact peering partner to coordinate response to attack. |
Download matching Best Practices
Next results