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1098 matching practices

Number	Best Practice
13-13-8960	Public Safety, Government should support configuration changes to isolate critical phone lines (incoming 9-1-1 calls for service) from administrative and other lines, taking into account hunt-groups, busy or no-answer rollover to other lines, rollover to other PSAPs, etc. to prevent an overload of non-critical lines from rolling-over to lines answered by 9-1-1 call-takers when experiencing a TDoS attack.
13-13-8961	Public Safety, Government should limit the amount and type of information about the ECC that is shared publicly, e.g., administrative telephone numbers, number of staff, type of communication technology in use, etc.
13-13-8962	Public Safety, Government should have a well-designed mutual aid plan with neighboring agencies (PSAPs) to help mitigate a swatting attack.
13-13-8963	Network Operators, Service Providers, Public Safety and Government should ensure laws or rules are in place along with service level agreements identifying requirements for service providers’ cooperation in providing the location of cellular phones and other devices accessing 9-1-1 services to quickly assist with a swatting attack.
13-13-8964	Public Safety, Government should work with the originating service provider and/or text control center in a swatting attack to assist with identifying or locating the orchestrators.
13-13-8965	Network Operators, Service Providers, Public Safety and Government should continuously monitor IP traffic for scanning, phishing attacks, and other suspicious cyber activity.
13-13-8966	Public Safety, Government should have a keen attention to detail by well-trained staff to recognize spoofed or non-valid information to mitigate the impacts of cyber attacks on incoming 9-1-1 calls and calls received on administrative emergency lines.
13-13-8967	Network Operators, Service Providers, Public Safety and Government should ensure that any 9-1-1 cyber architecture plan addresses a reliable fail over capability that includes elements of physical and logical diversity, redundancy, and resiliency.
13-13-8968	Public Safety, Government should provide common cyber practices for all interconnection paths, which may come from multiple service providers for resiliency sake.
13-13-8969	Public Safety, Government should provide common cyber practices for all interconnection paths that support mutual aid/inter-local arrangements for overflow and failover to other ECCs.
13-13-8970	Network Operators, Public Safety and Government should ensure that staff is well trained, in reporting of security incidents, weaknesses and suspicious activity and are equipped with intrusion detection capability, response tools, and processes linking operations alarms with security alerts that would support rapid response and mitigation capability.
13-13-8971	Network Operators, Public Safety and Government should monitor information flow and follow cyber requirements on handling of sensitive data.
13-13-8972	Network Operators, Public Safety and Government should consider restricting recursion and disabling the ability to send additional delegation information to help prevent DNS-based DoS attacks and cache poisoning.
13-6-1007	Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should consider establishing a geographically diverse back-up Emergency Operations Center.
13-6-5081	Equipment Suppliers should provide serial numbers on critical network components (e.g., circuit packs, field replaceable units).
13-6-5086	Equipment Suppliers should consider electronically encoding a unique identifier into non-volatile memory of critical elements (e.g., Field Replaceable Units, FRUs) for integrity and tracking.
13-6-5149	Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should, where feasible, ensure that intentional emissions (e.g., RF and optical) from network equipment and transmission facilities are secured sufficiently to ensure that monitoring from outside the intended transmission path or beyond facility physical security boundaries cannot lead to the obtaining of critical network operations information.
13-6-5170	Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should control or disable all administrative access ports (e.g., manufacturer) into R&D or production systems (e.g., remap access ports, require callback verification, add second level access gateway).
13-6-5173	Network Operators and Equipment Suppliers should design wireless networks (e.g., terrestrial microwave, free-space optical, satellite, point-to-point, multi-point, mesh) to minimize the potential for interception.
13-6-8021	Network Operators, Service Providers, and Equipment Suppliers should use switched network hubs in critical networks for Operations, Administration, Management, and Provisioning (OAM&P), so that devices in promiscuous mode are less likely to be able to see/spoof all of the traffic on that network segment.

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